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Abstract: This article aims to reflect on the banality of art in its 
quotidianity. It attempts to question by what social dynamics the 
common, the banal and the quotidian can come to have artistic 
value. The answer we seek to build for the question, observes 
this sensation in its dynamics of sociation, that is, as a bond, as 
a structure of the collective and experiential character of social 
life. By understanding the phenomenon as a total social fact, we 
can say that it is engendered and simultaneously engenders the 
societal bond in an intersubjective procedure that produces the 
shared sense.
Keywords: Art. Banality. Quotidian. Sociation/sociality. 
Intersubjectivity.
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BANALITY 
OF ART
A long discussion on the banality of art is present, although 
often not explicitly, in the reflection on art and aesthetics. The 
debate is present in the works from Dewey (1997), Gombrich 
(1999), Huyghe (1998) and Maffesoli (1990). Other authors, 
such as Cauquelin (1998), Crispolti (2004) and Guyau (2009) 
also mention it on their reflections on the uses that contemporary 
society makes of art, beauty and taste. In general, the banalization 
of art appears as the opposite theme, par excellence, to the 
question of the essentialization of art as a value system by 
modern and contemporary societies. What these authors point 
out, in general, is the need to think of art, first of all, in its organic 
dimension, that is, inalienable to the doing, to the being, to the 
daily exchange of social life.
However, to organically think art does not answer the 
tangential problem of the social nature of the work of art, because 
it is evident to all these authors, though the question is not usually 
formulated, that the organic dimension is not the only present 
in what, by different approaches, can be called "taste", "beau-
tiful", "art", "aesthetics", etc. Neither the complete imanentism 
nor the radical transcendentalism. It is not enough to understand 
the totality of art as a banal, quotidian and immersed in ordinary 
life fact; it is also necessary to question by what dynamics the 
common, the banal and the daily life can come to have value 
as taste – and here we try not to positivize the idea of taste, by 
understanding it as pleasure; on the contrary, we understand 
taste as sensation, that can be of pleasure or not.
The answer we seek to build for the question observes this 
sensation in its dynamics of sociation, that is, as a bond, as a 
structure of the collective and experiential character of taste. By 
understanding the phenomenon of taste as a total social fact 
– that is, in the Maussian concept, as a complex phenomenon 
which in itself has dimensions that are aesthetic, economic, polit-
ical, etc. – we can say that it is engendered and engenders the 
societal and intersubjective bond which produces the shared 
sense. What produces the totality or the organicity of art? The 
fact that this totality or organicity is produced intersubjectively. So, 
in summary, our understanding.
We begin the article by observing how the question of the 
banality of art is present in Dewey, Gombrich and Huyghe. 
Then, through Maffesoli, we put in the perspetive the Simme-
lian approach of sociation, understanding it as the mechanism 
that allows us to think of art in its intersubjective dimension. We 
then conclude the article by organizing the elements that allow 
us to think art through the societal and intersubjective bond that 
produces the shared sense.
THE THEME OF THE BANALITY OF ART IN DEWEY, 
GOMBRICH AND HUYGHE
In speaking about the experience of art, Dewey notes that what 
we call art is present in the early stages of man's production as 
a social being. This production is presented through the creation 
and manufacture of objects and tools to satisfy daily needs - 
such as those destined for domestic use, worshiping, production, 
reproduction, war, among others. It is important to note that these 
productions also present, throughout human history, a symbolic 
character that has been exhaustively explored by the history of 
art and societies. In making his analysis of art as an experience, 
Dewey points out how painting and sculpture were organically 
linked to architecture and the everyday life, being socially 
intended and produced, as one thing. 
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In this social and collective experience there would be no 
differentiation in respect to an "artistic" perception of these tools 
and the ways of using them: there was a utilitarian purpose, but 
there was also an imponderable dimension, due to the interrela-
tion between the individuals that, in our opinion, corresponds to 
what Simmel understands as sociation.
Similarly, music and song were intrinsically part of religious 
cults – even if they were not crossed by an artistic distinction – 
while preserving a given purpose and intersubjective dimension. 
Dewey thus emphasizes, although not using the term, the inter-
subjective connection between art and the everyday life, pointing 
to the impossibility of thinking of one, without thinking of the other 
(DEWEY, 1980, p.8). When Dewey states, for example, that
The intelligent mechanic, committed to his work, interested in doing 
it well and who finds satisfaction in his manual labor, treating with 
genuine affection his materials and tools, is artistically committed. 
(DEWEY, 1980, p.8).
In the first place, we can see, in his thought, these two 
dimensions to which we refer to as – that of the use, the purpose 
of the mechanic’s work, and that of the subjective satisfaction of 
the well-done work. This satisfaction, however, wouldn't be prop-
erly subjective, as it does not correspond to a symbolic produc-
tion that is born and dies in the mind of the mechanic, but rather 
a socially and, therefore, intersubjectively shared value. Similarly, 
the dimension of use would necessarily be equally intersubjec-
tive, since the mechanic's work takes place in a context: its value 
is not enclosed and restricted to the interest of the mechanic, but 
rather to a dynamic of social self-production of its use, to which 
confers, also intersubjectively, value to this object or action.
Where, in this example, is the art, the "affection," the "artful 
commitment" that Dewey speaks of? Evidently in this intersub-
jective and socially shared relationship. That is why Dewey diss-
aproves the restricted understanding of art, which perceives it 
as the sublime production of a spirit, as something destined for 
contemplation and produced according to the mechanism of an 
individual subjectivity:
For when what it is known as art is relegated to the museum or 
to the gallery, the uncontrollable impulse towards experiences 
that can be enjoyed in themselves finds as many escapes as the 
environment provides (DEWEY, 1980, p.6).
We see, therefore, that the intersubjective character is 
one of the main elements of art, and that art can, as its func-
tion, be present in all human activities: both in the construction of 
everyday and mundane artifacts, such as a comb or a spoon, as 
in the construction or use of a building; both in the handcraft work 
as in the bureaucratic or mechanical work, and, also, in the fleet-
ing and ordinary manifestations of human behavior in the face of 
a desire, of a belief, of an exchange, of an act of bonding – of a 
sociation, we could say, using Simmel.
Dewey emphasizes the functional character of artistic 
objects, listing them in their diversity:
The useful domestic tools of the house, like the shrouds, mats, 
jars, plates, bows, spears, were decorated with such care that we 
now pursue them and give them a place of honor in our museums. 
However, in their own time and place, such things were ways of 
exalting the processes of everyday life (DEWEY, 1989,  p.7).
But we may also think that functionality is not an absolute 
value, although it may be present as it is present in social rela-
tions. This idea seems tangent to us in Dewey's thought when he 
relates intersubjective elements of social life that are centered on 
nonfunctional processes, such as the tools that,
Instead of placing themselves in separate niches, they belonged 
to the display of prowess, to the manifestation of solidarity of the 
group or clan, to the worship of the gods, to festivals and feasts, 
to fighting, to hunting and to all the rhythmic crises that scored the 
current of living (DEWEY, 1989, p.7).
Thus, when Dewey discusses the aesthetic dimension 
present in objects and their uses, in their quotidianity and 
banality, he is not reducing the aesthetic dimension to an exclu-
sive functionality. On to the opposite, in doing so, he is actu-
ally noting that, even in its functionality, even in its banality and 
quotidianity, it is possible to achieve, in ordinary and mundane 
tools and uses, a dimension that concerns taste, beauty, non 
utilitarian pleasure and, possibly, also aesthetic. The aesthetic 
perception is a subjective component of this social experience 
which we understand as "taste", something that can be pres-
ent in any activity, ordinary or not, that generates pleasure and 
displeasure in man, here understood as a collective, social 
being (Dewey, 2000, p.11). 
The taste consists of the intersubjective action par excel-
lence, and this intersubjectivity, evoked as experience, would 
consist of the presence of art, in an indistinct and banal manner, 
in the various human activities. It is this dimension that confers 
to not necessarily elaborated tools an artistic "purpose", a dimen-
sion empowered by the taste. The same dimension can be found 
not only in the elaboration of the object, but also in its use. For 
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example, not only in the constructed housing, but also in its use; 
not just on the comb or the spoon, but also on how these two 
objects are used. And it would, still, be present in the manifesta-
tions of human behavior in society:
The collective life that manifested itself in war, in worship, or in the 
forum, did not know the division between what was characteristic of 
these places and operations, and the arts that brought them color, 
grace and dignity. (DEWEY, 1989, p.8).
This same idea about the banality and the quotidianity of 
art is present in Gombrich (1999), when, in the first chapter of 
his "The Story of Art", he observes that if we think of art as a 
form of human activity and manifestation, there is no civilization, 
there is no ethnicity in which the idea of art ceases to be present, 
usually in an untimely manner, devoid of canons and of concep-
tual closures that are generally present in Western civilization 
and in the closures operated by "history of art" and by "classic" 
aesthetic. Gombrich observes how the definition of the word art 
is ambiguous and diverse:
There is really nothing that can be called Art. [...] It does not 
harm anyone to call art all these activities, provided they keep in 
mind that such a word can mean very different things, at different 
times and places, and that Art with a capital A does not exist. 
(GOMBRICH, 1999, p.7)
Gombrich indicates, in short, that art is something negotia-
ble, and that its definition is associated to a certain time and to 
a certain place. Art is generated by a certain experience, culture; 
its shape changes and passes through negotiations. What is art 
here and now may not be in another context. From this perspec-
tive, there would be no thing, in definitive way, we can call art. 
There would be no such thing as a universal, categorical and 
unquestionable concept in itself.
In this sense, Gombrich notes that the objects and images 
produced by the first peoples or even by classical civilizations, for 
example, which are part of the so-called "history of art", were not 
necessarily created with the aim of provoking fruition. Its original 
production served specific purposes, usually utilitarian, quotidian 
and banalized, fulfilling functions of worship, protection or use in 
ordinary life. In this, we can refer to objects such as the Venus 
of Willendorf, the cave paintings of Lascaux, the sculptures of 
Greek athletes, Egyptian pyramids, sculptures and paintings, 
and tools of all kinds such as medieval combs and reliquaries, 
Indian masks, etc. The examples are too vast to be listed here, 
but Gombrich's conclusion clarifies the process: "[…] what we 
call 'work of art' is not the result of a mysterious activity but an 
object made by human beings for human beings" (GOMBRICH, 
1999, p.32). That is, art was born with human activity, organically 
linked to it in its daily life, shared in society.
Huyghe, starting from an art conception close to that of 
Gombrich,
[...] art is an essential function of man, indispensable to the 
individual and to societies, and that is imposed upon them as a 
necessity from prehistoric origins. Art and man are inseparable. 
There is no art without man, but perhaps there is also no man 
without art. (HUYGHE, 1998, p.11)
Despite the use of the word "man", the association 
between "man" and "humanism" must be avoided in the under-
standing of Huygue's work, in the traditional – and metaphysi-
cal - sense of spiritual humanity; that is, the understanding that 
art is produced as a refinement of sensibility and value judg-
ment. In this author, an understanding of art as a social and 
collective experience is tangent:
Thus art is in solidarity with man. With so much diversity and 
flexibility with the customs, it changes with the centuries and the 
latitudes. (HUYGHE, 1998, p.13).
Huyghe emphasizes that art should be thought of as an 
essential function of social life. A creature that lives in society 
and that in it makes its exchanges, shares its and other worlds, 
creates and re-creates incessantly, man has in art an instrument, 
a necessary subjective tool for the production of his reality and 
his being in the world. 
We can conclude that, through art, man forms and conforms 
an important stage of his social bond, of his association with 
other individuals or, more specifically, his sociality.
The concept of sociality that we use comes from Maffe-
soli, which, in turn, has its source in Simmel. In Simmel, 
the interaction between individuals, their reciprocal provi-
sion, constitutes the "Vergesellschaftung", a term that can 
be translated into English as sociation, the process through 
which people produce empathic bonds. For Simmel, a society 
thought as a sociation between individuals, as a figure with its 
own totality, does not exist; what exists, in fact, would be this 
process of sociation, or of construction of the societal bond, 
between individuals. According to Vandenberghe (2005, 
p.77), for Simmel, "society is not a concrete substance but 
a process of association, that is, a process that is continuous 
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and creator of spiritual interactions between individuals, 
rebonding them to one another". It is such a collective form of 
interaction that leads Maffesoli (2000), Simmel's interpreter, 
to elaborate his reflection on feeling together, qualifying it as 
a form of sociation, or more specifically, as the process of 
identification produced as impetus of attraction, aggregation, 
belonging, sharing, socialization, bonding, alliance, attach-
ment to the collective body. In this sense, it can be said that 
it is precisely this feeling together that conforms the bind-
ing to which Simmel refers, that connects the elements that 
conform the social body.
But let us go back to Huygue to remember that he affirms 
that art and man are inseparable, and that there isn’t one 
without the other. We can observe, preserving the under-
standing of man not as the individual and sensitive being 
idealized by humanism, but as a natural and collective being, 
that, in this way, the concept of art also in Huygue corre-
sponds to an idea of intersubjectivity and, therefore, to the 
process of sociality. It is in this sense that Huygue empha-
sizes that art is in solidarity with man, because it is inherent 
to him, to the point of accompanying him in his experience 
and sharing of the world – and in this accompaniment, it 
shares the diversity and flexibility in relation to culture – it 
changes, following man in his sociality, in the course of his 
being in the world and thus transforming himself, according 
to his social experience of temporality and spatiality.
ART AND SOCIATION IN MAFFESOLI
The three authors, Dewey, Gombrich and Huygue, depart 
from the peculiarities of the collective, intersubjective, 
cultural and social man, as well as from the needs of 
the collectivity to establish a reference for what we can 
understand as art. For them it is undeniable that, since 
the most archaic times, art has never been separated from 
other social activities.  It was never thought of separately 
or fragmented in relation to socially developed activities, 
because it was intrinsically linked to the daily life, which 
allows us to conclude that there is no social experience 
without art, and that there is no art without social experience. 
Art is closely linked to the human being, to his way of being 
in the world and, therefore, to the development of his 
sociations. Art is where man is, in his sociality.
And, therefore, in his collective and intersubjective expe-
rience, what brings us back to Maffesoli and his perception 
of being together, of sharing, of feeling in common that this 
thinker understands as being the fundamental ethos of all 
collectivity (Maffesoli: 1990; 2000). Indeed, Maffesoli contin-
ues along the same path as Dewey, Gombrich, and Huygue in 
relation to the understanding that beauty, taste, and aesthet-
ics are an intersubjective and naturalized experience of social 
life. However, as expected from a Simmelian sociologist, he 
displaces the sense of the taste from a social field understood 
as lived experience, or, as the content produced by those 
experiences, to a field centered on the bond, on the ongoing 
experience, on the experience as a bonding process or, more 
precisely, as a sociation, the interpersonal and collective rela-
tionships and benefits.
We can see the Simmelian heritage in Maffesoli in the 
understanding of this author that social life has as its funda-
mental phenomenon the continuous production of the link 
between individuals through an intersubjectivity produced by 
forms rather than by content.
In our judgment, Maffesoli completes the thought of the 
three authors covered earlier through his discussion on the feel-
ing together, the intersubjective faculty of consubstantiating in 
social experience, the banal and quotidian character of the work 
of art and allows us the possibility of going a little further with its 
formist perception in the sense of perceiving that the organic 
character present in the thought of the three authors mentioned 
above, also, corresponds to a process of sociation.
To better understand this situation, let us briefly look 
at Maffesoli's thought on aesthetics. First, it should be 
noted that the idea of aesthetics in it is not limited to the 
contemplative character – be it art, or life. His interest 
concerns what we may call the active character of percep-
tion, as part of ordinary activities that bring forms-of-be-
ing-together, in which states of enjoyment, perception, 
and interaction with the world occur. For him, the aesthetic 
is not necessarily linked to happiness and pleasure, but 
to any collective process given by interaction. It is in the 
collective action of individuals, in their interaction, in the 
alteration of their being-in-the-world, that the individual 
becomes an active and passive agent, concomitantly, of 
the world he experiences:
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[...] aesthetics is not individualistic, but rather, constitutes 
a global mass where, in an organic way, all the material and 
spiritual elements of the social and natural body enter into 
perpetual synergy (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.278)1
Maffesoli thinks art as something organic and daily 
produced by man in his relation to the other, that is, in the 
association, in the interaction, in a dynamic of the consti-
tution of bonds that ends up producing communions of 
perception and multiplying the bonds between the individ-
uals and the elements of the ordinary life, even when these 
are contrary or contradictory, provided that they conform to a 
form of being together.
Maffesoli understands art through the extension of the 
German concept of Kunstwollen, this artistic will, this mani-
festation of the spirit of a time that results from the common 
feeling of social life (1990, p.22). This concept, debated by 
the art historian Alois Riegl , points to this artistic will condi-
tioned by the world perspective proper to a community, to a 
sociality, in his experience of production of meaning on his 
own common experience.
This artistic will, these concrete manifestations of the spirit 
would be present, according to Riegl2 (2012) in all forms of 
being together, in all associations, since, when a social rela-
tion is produced, what is produced, as a result, is fundamen-
tally an exchange, a sharing, before even taking into account 
the judgments of values that are made in connection with this 
sharing, that is, of the contents also produced. These sharings 
– sociations, in the Simmelian sense – are consequences and 
results of the collective emotions produced in the social bond.
The inventory of possible examples is endless: it 
embraces everything that is emotionally activated collectively, 
regardless of physical or temporal dimensions, whether in a 
football crowd, in a music show or in the face of a dramatic 
everyday event that catalyzes attention, for example. But it 
would also occur in a temporarily prolonged experience, even 
if for several generations of common taste or values – that 
which is good or beautiful, or bad and ugly at a fair, for exam-
ple; or in a shared worship experience over the long duration 
1. “[...] l’esthétique n’est rien moins qu’individualisée, mais constitue plutôt une masse 
globale où, d’une manière organique, tous les éléments matériels et spirituels du 
corps social et naturel entrent en une perpétuelle synergie.”. (MADDESOLI, 1990, 
p.278). Author’s translation.
2. Frank, Isabelle. Alois Riegl (1858-1905) et l'analyse du style des arts plastiques. 
In: Littérature, Number 105, 1997. p.66-77.
of a community. In all of these collectives that, eventually, 
become interrelated, there will be an experience of emotional 
sharing, a sociation that has an aesthetic dimension.
Thinking with Maffesoli in mind, it would no longer be 
possible to understand art exclusively in the works institu-
tionalized by the art system – that system which Coquelin 
discusses, observing it as a network of mediators, between the 
artist, his work and the public, contribute to the legitimation, as 
art, of certain objects and practices (Coquelin, 2005, p.65-84). 
It would be necessary to include in this vision also the organic, 
banal and quotidian whole that, in everyday life, in everyday 
situations and practices, no matter how small, make up what, 
from the thought of Simmel, Maffesoli calls association or soci-
ality: the social life in its production, including its banal objects 
and processes, for the same “constituent le terreau sur lequel 
s’élèvent culture et civilisation.” (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.22)3. 
Thinking similarly to Dewey, Maffesoli states that
The art that will be observed in the overcoming of the 
architectural functionalism or that usual object. From a type of 
life to a domestic ad, everything is meant to become a work of 
creation, everything can be understood as the expression of a 
first aesthetic experience. Therefore, art could not be reduced 
only to artistic production, I mean those of artists, but becomes 
an existential fact (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.12)4 
Maffesoli, like Dewey, Gombrich and Huygues, contrib-
utes, according to our understanding, to the understand-
ing of art as an intersubjective fact, as something that has 
existence independent of the negotiations between the 
social actors that belong to a closed field, said artistic, that 
conforms in respect to the subject and the system of codes, 
values and references that he calls "art". With this proposi-
tion, Mafessoli allows us to reach a critical dimension that, 
although tangential to the works of Dewey, Gombrich and 
Huygues, is not yet formulated: the criticism to the modern 
3. Let us make it clear that sociation is different from socialization; sociation 
enacts social processes, a notion analogous to the social form, a notion that is 
also present in Simmel and Maffesoli. The sociation takes place in the collective 
social experience marked by the emotional bond, by vitalism, by internal reason, 
by organic thought, and finally by a feeling together where the affinities and 
differences inherent in human relations are present. “[...] toutes ces choses 
anodines qui, par sédimentation, constituent la trame de la socialité banale.” 
(MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.20).
4. "L'art qui va s'observer dans le dépassement du fonctionnalisme architectural 
ou dans celui de l'objet usuel. Un cadre de vie à la réclame du design ménager, 
tout entend devenir oeuvre de création, tout peut se comprendre comme 
l'expression d'une expérience esthétique prémière. Dès lors, l'art ne saurait être 
réduit à la seule prodution artistique, j'entends celle des artistes, mais devient un 
fait existentiel." (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.12). Author’s translation.
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episteme, through the realization that it rests, essentially, 
on a separation between nature and culture, intangible to 
the contemporary – or non-modern, or even postmodern – 
look, which allows one to understand the present organicity, 
precisely between these two spheres, in its elements
[...] of totally disparate elements that establish constant 
interactions between one another made of aggressiveness or 
kindness, love and hate, but which constitute a specific solidarity 
that must be taken into account.(MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.15)5.
The idea of intersubjectivity becomes, in Maffesoli, the 
idea of "culture of feelings" (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.31), that is, 
the perception that emotions, fruit of the attractions aroused 
by desires and feelings of belonging produced in the socia-
tion of individuals, occur simultaneously as an aesthetic and 
ethical link:
[...] the value, the admiration, the hobby, the taste that is shared 
become cement, they are vectors of ethics. To be more precise, 
I call ethics a morality "without obligation or penalty"; without 
obligation other than that of adding, of being a member of a 
collective body, without penalty other than that of being excluded, 
ending the interest that binds me to the group.(MAFFESOLI, 
1990, p.31)6
Aesthetics constitutes a feeling of ethics in relation to the 
collective and, thus, a feeling together capable of generat-
ing social forms. It is the same conception of art as that of 
Gombrich, Huygue, and Dewey: art as an organic produc-
tion of meanings – with the addition of the formulation on the 
sociation as a engine to the aesthetic process and of the crit-
ical formulation to the process of subjection, of the aesthetic 
process itself, certain values about what the beautiful is. 
ART AS AN INTERSUBJECTIVE PHENOMENON
We can conclude that art is something that, naturally, is 
produced by man in his processes of being together and 
feeling together, in his process of being in the world and 
participating in this world, which is, mainly, done through an 
5. "[...] totalement disparates que établissent entre eux des interactions constantes 
faites d’agressivité ou d’amabilité, d’amour ou de haine, mais qui n’en constituent 
pas moins une solidarité spécifique qu’il faut prendre en compte.". (MAFFESOLI, 
1990, p.15). Author’s translation.
6. "[...] la valeur, l’admiration, le “hobby”, le goût qui sont partagés deviennent 
ciment, sont vecteurs d’éthique. Pour être plus précis, j’appelle éthique une 
moralle “sans obligation ni sanction”; sans obligation autre que celle de s’agréger, 
d’être membre du corps collectif, sans sanction autre que celle d’être exclu si 
cesse l’intérrêt (inter-esse) qui me lie au groupe." (MAFFESOLI, 1990, p.31). 
Author’s translation.
ordinary and collective knowledge which, experienced in daily 
life of interactions, experienced intersubjectively, dispenses all 
aurification, all differentiation and all protection conferred by 
the title of "art", or "work of art."
Art is generated in the process of sociation, in sociality, 
and ontologically, exists only there. That is, it is provoked, 
generated, cultivated and sustained in the experience, in the 
experience of being together. Hence, it is intersubjective, it is 
intrinsically related to the activity and social experience. Art 
conforms, according to sociality, with the way that men have 
of establishing interactions; it is one of the results of a way of 
being together. It is form, since it is conformed by a process 
of interactivity and its occurrence is only possible in society, or 
rather, in the process of sociation.
On this perspective, we can put the question stated at the 
beginning of this article: to what extent, exactly, is art banal? 
To what extent, can we say that it is banal?
The first response derives from the fact that art, or the 
feeling of taste, is a total social fact. The concept of Mauss 
(2003) thus understands social phenomena characterized 
by a complexity that would not be possible to be understood, 
exclusively, through a single dimension, be it economic, politi-
cal, religious, linguistic, cultural, aesthetic, etc. .
Being a total social fact, the taste or the art conform 
a process of composite overlapping of social relations, a 
process that is equally complex, that is, characterized by the 
impossibility of being reduced to vectors of interest and power 
or to objective forms of understanding the social bond.
In order to better understand this process, we find in 
Simmel's work a development of the perception of this type 
of complexity through the Wechselwirkung notion, which could 
be translated to reciprocal effects or effects of reciprocity, the 
general phenomenon that leads to the production of socia-
tions, or a process of empathic construction of social bonds. 
Papilloud (2002) discusses at length the relationship between 
Mauss and Simmel's thoughts, understanding that, even 
though they occupy different epistemological positions, there 
is a close proximity and even a methodological complementar-
ity between them (PAPILLAUD, 2002, p.31).
Maffesoli's approach to taste and art is directly a tribute to 
Simmel's thought. His perception that the aesthetic is produced 
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as ethos comes from the Simmelian reading that what forms 
the society are those effects of reciprocity that are at the base of 
human life and that conform the whole social experience.
If we understand this process as an intersubjective social 
dynamic, it is based on the idea that the reciprocity effects 
constitute not simply an event of commutation of subjectiv-
ities, a communion of subjects, but simply the fundamental 
phenomenon that makes society work. It is necessary to clar-
ify that our perception on the phenomenon of intersubjectiv-
ity starts from the Heideggerian critique (1993) to Husserl's 
thought that intersubjectivity would be the commutation 
between subjectivities, the communion between subjects. 
More than that, Heidegger suggests, intersubjectivity consti-
tutes the very ontological procedure – and, therefore, char-
acteristic of the human being – that gives meaning to living 
together, to the social being.
If art is banal – or rather, if there is a banality in taste – it is 
because, therefore, it commutes intersubjectively.
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